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Clearly, Florida's procedure for revoking the conditional liberty of those
arrested for felonies needs to be harmonized with the minimal requirements
of due process set by the United States Supreme Court. By utilizing the existing committing magistrate system 44 to determine probable cause in revocation
cases, the state would save jail space, reduce the number of full-fledged revocation hearings, and, most important, help minimize the loss of liberty caused by
45
unjustified arrests.
JOHN M. WELCH, JR.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE: THE CLASS ACTION
A SOCIAL WEAPON DISARMED?

-

Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 94 S.Ct. 505 (1973)
By permitting discharges from its New York plant to be carried by stream
into Lake Champlain, International Paper Company allegedly polluted the
waters of the lake, thereby damaging the surrounding property. Vermont
plaintiffs sought damages in a diversity action1 in federal district court on
behalf of a class consisting of themselves as named parties, and 200 other lakefront property owners and lessees as unnamed parties.2 The Court of Appeals
44.
45.

R. CraIN. P. §3.120 (1972).
Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
FLA.

1. See 28 U.S.C. §1232(a) (1970). This statute provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between - (1)citizens of different
States."
2. Plaintiffs brought a class action suit under FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(3), which provides:
"(a) Prerequisitesto a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3)the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
"(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition . . . (3)the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to
the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."
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for the Second Circuit affirmed 3 the district court, which had refused to permit
4
the suit to proceed as a class action and had dismissed the unnamed parties.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed and HELD,
each plaintiff, named or unnamed in a rule 23(b)(3) class action must individually meet the minimum jurisdictional amount to avoid dismissal from
the case.5
Plaintiffs invoking federal diversity jurisdiction under United States Code,
title 28, section 1332, must allege that the "matter in controversy" exceeds a
threshold amount, currently $10,000.6 In a 1911 diversity case, the Court held
this "matter in controversy" requirement applicable to each one of multiple
-plaintiffs in suits involving separate and distinct claims. 7 Aggregation of claims
was forbidden where none of the plaintiffs met the amount requirement, and
claimants failing to satisfy the requirement were dismissed.8 Where claims
arose from a common and undivided right, however, plaintiffs could aggregate
claims to satisfy the "matter in controversy" requirement o
Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 did not significantly alter this scheme. Rule 23, which formally recognized class actions,
preserved the historical distinction between multiple plaintiffs with common
and undivided claims and multiple plaintiffs -with separate and distinct
claims.10 In "spurious" class actions1' - those involving separate and distinct

See generally Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device
and Its Utilization, 22 U. Fr.A. L. REV.631 (1970).
3. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting),
noted in 73 COLUm. L. REy. 359 (1973).
4. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971). See 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)
(1970) providing for interlocutory appeals by certification from the district court; Comment,
Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1292, 1293-94 (1970).
5. 94 S.Ct. 505 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
6. See note 1 supra. The phrase "matter in controversy" has been the subject of judicial
interpretation since 1832. See Seaver v. Bigelows, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 208 (1866); Stratton v.
Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4 (1832); Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832). The intent
of Congress in establishing the jurisdictional amount requirement was that: "The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the federal courts into courts of big
business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies." S. RaP.
No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 304 (1948); H.R. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). The
$10,000 amount requirement applies irrespective of the remedy sought. "In injunction actions,
the amount in controversy is not the amount that plaintiff might recover at law, but the
value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented." C. Wiuonr,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS §33, at 116 (2d ed. 1970).
7. "When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the
requisite jurisdictional amount .... Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40
(1911). Accord, Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916).
8. See, e.g., Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243, 244 (1920).
9. See, e.g., Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959) (single tract
of land claimed by Indian tribe).
10. Prior to 1966, rule 23 class actions were divided into three types: true, hybrid, and
spurious. "The true class suit involved principles of compulsory joinder and rights of a
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claims -judicial authority continued to prohibit the aggregation of insufficient claims. 12 The adoption of rule 23, a procedural rule, had little effect on
the "matter in controversy" requirement of section 1332.13
With the amendment of rule 23 in 1966,14 categories of class actions under
the old rule were discarded.' The new rule 23 was intended to provide a
functional, pragmatic approach to class actions in place of the perplexing
conceptualism of the old rule. 6 Nevertheless, it was unclear whether the
amended rule would produce new principles concerning aggregation of claims,
or whether the former doctrines governing spurious class actions would still
17
control.
The United States Supreme Court provided an answer in Snyder v. Harris.8
Plaintiffs, each having a claim less than $10,000, argued that in light of the
rationale underlying the 1966 amendment to rule 23,19 aggregation of separate
and distinct claims should be permitted. 20 Focusing on past interpretations of

joint, common, or secondary character . . . . The hybrid class suit involved rights of a
several character, where the object of the action was the adjudication of claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action . . . . The spurious class suit dealt with
rights of a several character where there was a common question of law or fact." 3B J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRAcricm 1123.02-1, at 23-121 (2d ed. 1969). See 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966) (Advisory
Comm. Note to Proposed Rule 23); Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 COLUM.
L. REv.1554, 1555-56 (1968).
11. "The spurious class suit was a permissive joinder device .... The right or liability
of each party was distinct. The class was formed solely by a common question of law or
fact. When a suit was brought by or against such a class, it was merely an invitation to
joinder . . .which might or might not be accepted. It was an invitation and not a command performance." J. MooRE, supra note 10, ff23.10(3)(l), at 2601-03.
12. See Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 308 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.
1962); Ames v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951); Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 385 (1941).
13. "The doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated was never,
and is not now, based upon the categories of old Rule 23 or of any rule of procedure. That
doctrine is based rather upon this Court's interpretation of the statutory phrase 'matter in
controversy.'" Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969). See Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of Amended Rule 23, 32 A.B.A. Arrausr
L.J. 254 (1966).
14. The text of amended rule 23 is set forth in note 2 supra.
15. See, e.g., Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
16. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972); C. Wsicsrr, supra
note 6, §72, at 307.
17. The courts of appeals were divided on this point. See Alvarez v. Pan Am. Life Ins.
Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967) (holding no change in the
aggregation prohibition). But see Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
18. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The issue addressed in Snyder was whether the 1966 amendment
of rule 23 changed the jurisdictional amount requirements of §1332 in class actions formerly
classified as spurious.
19. 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (1966) (Advisory Comm. Note to Proposed Rule 23) (amendment was intended to achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and to promote
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. I), 81 H~Av.
L. REv. 356, 393 (1967).
20. 394 U.S. at 333.
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section 1832, rather than on rule 23, the Court rejected this argument and
stated categorically that aggregation was still prohibited where claims were
separate and distinct.21 Absent a joint or common interest, therefore, each

party was required to individually meet the jurisdictional amount requirement
in section 1332 diversity actions.22
Unlike the named plaintiffs in Snyder, none of whom satisfied the minimum jurisdictional amount, all four named plaintiffs in the instant case met
the requirement. 23 Thus, the issue was whether unnamed parties, as well as
named parties, in a rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount. A majority of the Supreme Court, finding Snyder to be controlling,
held that each plaintiff must individually meet the requirement.24 Ignoring
the dissent's contention that changes in civil rules have consistently affected
the jurisdictional framework, the Court reasoned that to overrule Snyder
would undermine congressional intent in setting limits on federal jurisdic2
tion. 5
In concluding that Snyder dictated the result reached in the instant case,
26
the Court failed to consider adequately the differences between the two cases.
In the instant case all named plaintiffs met the jurisdictional amount, so that
jurisdiction over the action was not at issue;27 in Snyder none of the named

parties satisfied the $10,000 requirement and hence jurisdiction over the action
could never have attached. 2 Furthermore, reliance by Snyder and the instant
majority on Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc. 29 appears unjustified because Clark was a
joinder case, not a class action.30 These disparities led the dissent in the
principal case to conclude that neither Snyder nor Clark was controlling.81

21. Id. at 336.
22. Id. at 335. See generally Note, Aggregation Doctrine Continues To Limit Class
Actions, 24 Sw. L.J. 354 (1970).
23. Compare Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333 (1969), with Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505, 507 (1973).
24. "None of the plaintiffs in Snyder v. Harris alleged a claim exceeding $10,000, but
there is no doubt that the rationale of that case controls this one." 94 S. Ct. at 511.
25. Id.
26. Both the district and the circuit court factually distinguished the two cases, though
each found Snyder dispositive of the aggregation issue. See Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
53 F.R.D. 430, 432 (D. Vt. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972).
27. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. at 507.
28. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The petitioner in Snyder sought damages of
$8,740. If all other claims had been aggregated, however, the amount in controversy would
have been $1,200,000. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333 (1969).
29. 306 US. 583 (1939).
30. Id. at 589. Moreover, only one of numerous named plaintiffs met the amount requirement. Id. at 585-86.
31. 94 S. Ct. at 516. The dissents position on the issue appears to have been contemplated by at least one commentator who, prior to the instant decision, concluded that
only original parties need meet the amount in controversy requirement in a rule 23(b)(3)
suit. J. MooRE, supra note 10, 123.95. See also Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356 (1921) (permitting federal courts to do hse mc. necessary to effectuate their
judgments).
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The most significant shortcoming of the majority's opinion was its failure
to deal adequately with the dissent's argument regarding ancillary jurisdiction.
This judicially created doctrine permits the court, in its discretion, to disregard the jurisdictional amount requirements with respect to parties whose
claims should be heard in the same proceeding with those meeting the requirement. 32 Essentially, a judicial timesaving device, 33 ancillary jurisdiction
has been applied to compulsory counterclaims 34 and to claims by intervening
parties, 35 among others. In reasoning that the doctrine should be applicable
to unnamed parties in class action suits, the dissent advanced several arguments. First, the rule 23(b)(3) requirement that class-related issues predominate
over individual claims would prevent ancillary jurisdiction from becoming a
facade hiding nondiverse parties' attempts to secure federal adjudication of
unrelated claims. 36 Moreover, failure to invoke ancillary jurisdiction might
result in needless expense and redundant litigation. Unnamed plaintiffs failing
to meet the $10,000 requirement would be forced to litigate their claims in
state courts; but, since class actions are discouraged or are unavailable in many
states, numerous state claims would have to be heard separately.37 Named
parties, meanwhile, could litigate the same issues in federal court. Because all
claims arose out of the same set of circumstances, the same proof would be
presented and the same expert witnesses heard. Thus, while the majority advocated efficiency in the courts, its rejection of the ancillary jurisdiction argu35
ment would actually promote judicial diseconomy.
Another criticism of the instant decision is that it undermines the basic
purpose of rule 23(b)(3) class actions: to provide an efficient and economically

32. "[A] district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an entirety and
may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly before it possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not take cognizance were they independently presented." C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, §9, at 19. For a discussion of the history
of ancillary jurisdiction, see 1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoir, FEDERAL PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

§23 (1961).
33. See generally Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules, 64 I-Auv. L. REv.
968 (1951).
34. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961); Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
35. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
36. 94 S. Ct. at 514-15.
37. "[T]here is no guarantee that a class action could be initiated in the state court.
Many states discourage class actions and if the individual claims are so small that suit
would have to be instituted in a state court of limited jurisdiction, most likely the class
action device would be unavailable." Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040
(2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting).
38. 94 S. Ct. at 515. Ignoring the jurisdiction-shifting effect necessarily entailed by rejection of ancillary jurisdiction, the majority in the instant case focused on the increased
federal workload resulting from invocation of the doctrine. This fear appears largely ungrounded. "[N]amed plaintiffs here meet the jurisdictional requirements; a federal court
must adjudicate their claims. The burden on the federal courts would not be substantially
increased if the claims of the other class members were to be heard by the same court .... "
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting).
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effective procedure for adjudicating closely related claims. 9 Litigation of the
small claims that comprise most class actions- will be virtually precluded in
federal forums. Consumer actions against merchants present a vivid illustration. Most such actions involve claims of less than $300,41 so that the cost of
litigation, when balanced against the potential benefit, will be prohibitive.
The predominance of small claims in class action suits raises additional
problems that the courts eventually will have to confront. First, some feasible
procedure must be established for determining whether each of the unnamed
parties meets the $10,000 minimum. 42 In the instant case, as in all federal
cases, the district court turned first to the sufficiency of the pleadings and
denied class action status to all unnamed parties solely on that basis.4- The
instant case was atypical in that it was possible to deduce from the pleadings
that the unnamed plaintiff's claims fell below the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum. 44 Such a determination on the pleadings alone, however, will be extremely difficult in most rule 23(b)(3) class actions. 45 Moreover, once unnamed
parties are severed from the suit, the remaining plaintiffs may fail to meet the
requirement that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." 40 If this requirement is not met, the suit may not be maintain47
able as a class action, forcing parties to litigate their claims individually.
Another significant aspect of the principal case is its extension of the Snyder
doctrine beyond diversity actions to include class actions founded upon general
federal question jurisdiction.4" The practical effect of this extension is to limit
class actions to cases governed by statutes that do not require the $10,000
jurisdictional amount. 49 Although such statutes are found in several areas

39. See Eisen v. Carlisle 8- Jacquelin, 891 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Escott v. Barchris
Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
40. See Deans, Class Action Lawsuits, 1 EDrrORIAL RESEARCH RE'. 3 (1973).
41. Id. at 4. See generally Note, Consumer Class Actions: A Proposal for Florida, 26
U. FLA. L. REv. 58 (1973).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), which requires that judgment in a (b)(3) action "indude and specify or describe those ... whom the court finds to be members of the class."
43. "T]he District Court was convinced to 'a legal certainty' that not every individual
owner in the class had suffered pollution damages in excess of $10,000." 94 S. Ct. at 507.
44. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1970).
45. The courts will face the dilemma of ruling on the sufficiency of the claim of each
unnamed party. See 73 COLUM. L. REv. 359, 371 (1973). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
46. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
47. Id. See also Comment, supra note 45, at 371.
48. 28 U.S.C. §131 (1970). "Because a class action invoking general federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 would be subject to the same jurisdictional amount rules
with respect to plaintiffs having separate and distinct claims, the result here would be the
same even if a cause of action under federal law could be stated ... or if substantive federal
law were held to control the case." 94 S.Ct. at 512 n.ll. See, e.g., Rucker v. Wills, 358
F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973) (class suit to prevent future environmental damage dismissed
for failure of unnamed parties to satisfy jurisdictional amount).
49. For examples of some exempted areas see 28 U.S.C. §1333 (admiralty, maritime, and
prize cases), §1334 (bankruptcy matters and proceedings), §1337 (commerce and antitrust
regulations), §1338 (patents, copyrights, trademtrksi asd usfair competition).
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where federal class action litigation is common, they are restricted to cases
raising claims with a certain subject matter.50 The class action device, however,
serves a useful function across the entire range of legal questions. Thus, in
those areas not exempted by statute, the holding in the instant case will
severely limit class suits.
From the standpoint of social policy, and in view of the underlying purpose
of class action law,51 a broader solution is mandated. Such a solution could
readily be provided by congressional amendment of section 1332, expanding
the phrase "matter in controversy" to provide for aggregation of claims in any
case that meets the class action requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 52 This action would revitalize a much needed federal remedy. No
longer would the class action be restricted to the "extraordinary situation"
where all parties' claims exceed $10,000. 53 Unless the instant decision is legislatively modified, there can be little doubt that efforts to modernize the federal
54
law of class actions will be severely impaired.
ROBERT

T.

CUNNINGHAM, JR.

50. See Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §78(a) (1970); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365(a) (Supp. 1973); Clean
Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §1857(h)-2(a)(1) (1970).
51. J. MooRE, supra note 10, 1l23.02(l), .05.
52. It would be "highly desirable if Congress were to amend 28 U.S.C. §1332 to provide
that in any case permitted to be maintained as a class action under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the aggregate claims for or against all members of the class shall be regarded as a matter in controversy." Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 184 (1970).
53. C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, §72, at 316.
54. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972).
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